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1.  Introduction 
 
The  focus  of  this  paper  is  the  interpretation  of  DP  quantifiers  in  clausal 
comparatives, cf. (1). Recent work has greatly advanced our understanding of this 
topic (Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002, Schwarzschild 2004, Heim 2006a), yet 
several puzzles remain.  In particular, though recent advances have rectified many 
of the problems encountered by earlier theories (von Stechow 1984, Rullmann 
1995), it is unclear whether they retain all the benefits of these earlier theories.  A 
case  in  point  is  the  explanation  of  the  unacceptability  of  downward  entailing 
quantifiers in comparative clauses, illustrated in (2). 
 
(1)  Mary is taller than every boy is. 
(2)  *Mary is taller than no boy is. 
 
  One  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  reconcile  the  advances  made  by 
Schwarzschild, Wilkinson and Heim with an account of the unacceptability of 
downward entailing quantifiers in comparative clauses.  The analysis I suggest 
will be different in character from the accounts of von Stechow and Rullmann, 
which depend on the undefinedness of a maximality operator.  Rather I suggest 
(following another idea sketched in von Stechow 1984) that comparative clauses 
containing downward entailing quantifiers yield trivial truth conditions and that it 
is this triviality that underlies their unacceptability. 
  Once such an analysis of the downward entailing cases is in place, we will 
see that problems arise for another class of quantifiers, namely, non-monotonic 
quantifiers,  such  as  exactly  two  boys,  between  five  and  ten  girls  and  an  even 
number  of  tapirs.    The  analysis  of  the  downward  entailing  cases  yields  truth 
conditions that are too weak for non-monotone quantifiers.   
 
(3)  Mary is taller than exactly three boys are. 
 
Focusing on the case of exactly quantifiers, I will show that the problems can be 
resolved if we recognize that non-monotonic quantifiers have a complex structure.  
In  particular,  we  must  follow  Landman  (1998)  and  Krifka  (1999)  in  treating 
exactly two as having the same denotation as two but triggering the obligatory 
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analysis  of  non-monotonic  quantifiers,  coupled  with  a  plausible  pragmatic 
principle constraining the level at which implicatures are introduced, yields the 
correct  truth  conditions  for  comparative  clauses  containing  non-monotonic 
quantifiers. 
  In Section 2, I sketch a semantic theory (M-theory) for comparatives that 
reflects  the  important  features  of  Schwarzschild’s  (2004)  and  Heim’s  (2006a) 
theories, as well as the rudiments of an alternative theory (E-theory) that I will 
ultimately  endorse.    The  two  theories  are  compared  on  the  basis  of  their 
predictions  for  certain  basic  cases.    Both  are  found  wanting.    In  Section  3,  I 
review  the  predictions  of  the  standard  theory  (von  Stechow  1984)  concerning 
downward entailing quantifiers in comparative clauses.  M-theory and E-theory  
are evaluated against the standard theory on this point – to the advantage of E-
theory.  In Section 4, I turn to the problem that non-monotic quantifiers pose for 
E-theory.  The solution based on Landman (1998) and Krifka (1999) is sketched.  
Section 5 provides additional support for E-theory.  Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2.  The Basic Problem 
 
In the course of the paper, I will compare two theories of the meaning of clausal 
comparatives.    The  first,  which  I  will  refer  to  as  the  maximality  theory  (M-
Theory),  represents  the  insights  of  Schwarzschild  &  Wilkinson  (2002), 
Schwarzschild (2004) and Heim (2006a).  The unique features of this approach 
are (i) that it places a scope-taking operator with in the than-clause and (ii) it 
applies the set of degrees abstracted from the than-clause to the maximal degree 
to which the main clause is true – hence the name ‘maximality’ theory.  The 
scope-taking  operator  I  have  placed  in  the  than-clause  is  negation  (cf. 
Schwarzschild 2008).  Henceforth, I will refer to the set of degrees contributed by 
the  comparative  clause  containing  negation  as  CC,  and  the  set  of  degrees 
contributed by the main clause MC.  
 
(4)  M(aximality)-Theory 
  For A an individual, P a scalar predicate and Q a DP quantifier 
  A is P-er than Q is  is True iff 
  max({d:A is d-P})  {d: Q is not d-P}    
           
                           MC            CC 
(5)  max(D) :=  d[d D &  d' D d'  d] 
 
  This theory will be contrasted with an alternative theory, which I refer to 
as the existential theory (E-theory).  I argue that it is the E-theory that is best able 
to capture the truth conditions of comparatives containing quantifiers.  The E-
theory incorporates the scope-taking element in the than-clause that constitutes a 
central part of the M-theory.  E-theory, however, imposes a different relationship 
on  MC  and  CC.    Whereas  M-theory’s  truth  conditions  require  the  maximal 
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that MC and CC overlap, i.e. share some member.  Hence the name ‘existential’ 
theory.  See the Appendix for a fully spelled out LF. 
 
(6)  E(xistential)-Theory 
  For A an individual, P a scalar predicate and Q a DP quantifier 
  A is P-er than Q is  is True iff 
  {d: A is d-P} {d: Q is not d-P}      
 
I assume throughout that gradable adjectives are monotone. 
 
(7)  a.  a function of type <d,<e,t>> is monotone iff         
         x d d'[f(d)(x)=1 & d'<d   f(d')(x)=1]            (cf. Heim 2000) 
 
  b.  [[ tall]]  =  d. x.height(x)   d    
 
  We will now compare the basic predictions of M-theory and E-theory.  
The  intuitions  behind  the  two  theories  are  clear  when  we  consider  cases 
comparing the measures of individuals.  Consider the sentence (8).  Under M-
Theory, to see if the sentence is true you find Mary’s height and see if it is a 
standard of height that Bill fails to meet.  Under the E-theory, you need only see if 
there is some standard of height that Mary meets and Bill does not.  In this case, 
the conditions are equivalent.  In more complex cases, the theories diverge in their 
predictions. 
 
(8)  Mary is taller than Bill is is True iff               
    a. E-theory: {d: Mary is d-tall} {d: Bill is not d-tall}   
    b. M-theory: Mary's height   {d: Bill is not d-tall} 
 
2.1.  Basic Facts about Quantifiers in CC 
 
In this section we see how M-theory and E-theory differ when we replace the 
embedded subject in a sentence like (8) with a true quantifier.  We will approach 
the quantifiers by dividing them up in terms of monotonicity.  As we shall see in 
more  detail  in  Section  3,  when  Q  in  the  schemata  in  (5)  and  (6)  is  upward-
entailing, M-theory and E-theory give equivalent – and correct – truth conditions. 
For example, both theories predict (9b) to be true if and only if Mary’s height is 
greater than the height of the shortest boy. 
 
(9)    a. Q is upward-entailing (UE) iff for all sets A, B s.t. A B, Q(A) Q(B) 
  b. Mary is taller than some boy is.             
      E-theory: {d: Mary is d-tall} {d:some boy is not d-tall}         
      M-theory: Mary's height   {d: some boy is not d-tall}         
 
  The theories part ways first on the case of downward entailing quantifiers.  
As observed above, such quantifiers lead to unacceptability in comparatives. M-
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these cases have coherent, contingent truth conditions (though the matter is more 
complicated, as we will see in Section 3).  For example, M-theory predicts that 
(10b) is true if and only if Mary is at most as tall as the shortest boy. 
 
(10)   a. Q is downward entailing (DE) iff for all sets A,B s.t. A B, Q(B) Q(A) 
  b. *Mary is taller than no boy is.             
       E-theory: {d: Mary is d-tall} {d: no boy is not d-tall}     [tautology] 
       M-theory: Mary's height   {d: no boy is not d-tall}           [wrong] 
 
E-theory, on the other hand, offers a possible explanation for the unacceptability 
of DE-Qs in CC.  Consider the truth conditions that E-theory predicts for (10b).  
They require that there be some standard of height that Mary meets and that no 
boy doesn’t meet – that is, that every boy meets.  Notice that there is always some 
standard the Mary and every boy meet.  So, E-theory predicts the sentence to be a 
tautology.  In Section 3, I will show that this is systematically the case with DE-
Qs.  I furthermore suggest that it is this systematic triviality that underlies the 
unacceptability  of  DE-Qs  in  comparatives.    It  appears  that  E-theory  has  an 
advantage over M-theory on DE-Qs. 
  Finally, we come to the case of non-monotonic quantifiers.  Here we will 
see that M-theory has the advantage.  M-theory correctly predicts that in order for 
(11b) to be true Mary both must be taller than two boys and cannot be taller than 
three boys.  In other words, M-theory is able to impose a maximum on the height 
of the subject; in this case, the height of the third shortest boy, if there is one.  
 
(11)  a. Q is non-monotonic (NM) iff Q is neither UE nor DE 
  b. Mary is taller than exactly 2 boys are.           
      E-theory:{d:Mary is d-tall} {d:exactly 2 boys are not d-tall}     [weak] 
      M-theory:Mary's height   {d: exactly 2 is not d-tall}           
 
E-theory, on the other hand, is incapable of imposing a maximum on the height of 
the subject.  It can only impose a lower bound.  Hence, E-theory predicts that 
(11b) is true if and only if Mary is taller than the second shortest boy.  These 
truth-conditions are obviously too weak.  In Section 3, I will show that E-theory 
can  be  fixed  on  this  point  once  we  pay  more  attention  to  the  structure  and 
interpretation of non-monotonic quantifiers. 
 
2.2.  Summary 
 
In  this  section  we  have  laid  out  two  theories  (M-theory  and  E-theory)  of  the 
interpretation of clausal comparatives.  Though superficially similar, the theories 
yield  divergent  predictions  about  the  truth  conditions  of  comparative  clauses 
containing DP quantifiers.  M-theory and E-theory give equivalent results when 
the quantifier is UE.  E-theory provides a foundation for a semantic explanation of 
the unacceptability of DE-Qs in comparatives; M-theory does not.  Finally, M-
theory gives the right results for non-monotonic quantifiers, whereas E-theory 
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greater detail. 
 
 
3.  Downward Entailing Quantifiers in Comparative Clauses 
 
In this section, we examine the predictions of M-theory and E-theory concerning 
DE-Qs  against  the  backdrop  of  the  predictions  of  the  standard  theory  (von 
Stechow 1984, Rullmann 1995, Heim 2000).  First, in Section 3.1, we review the 
compelling  account  of  the  unacceptability  of  DE-Qs  in  CC  offered  by  von 
Stechow (1984). Then, in Section 3.2, we see that M-theory systematically fails to 
account for this unacceptability.  Instead, M-theory predicts that a CC containing 
a  DE-Q  imposes  a  maximum  on  the  measure  of  the  subject.    This  will  be 
significant in our discussion of non-monotonic quantifiers in Section 4.  Finally, 
in Section 3.3, we see that E-theory predicts trivial truth conditions in these cases.  
I  argue,  following  a  suggestion  in  von  Stechow  (1984),  that  this  triviality  is 
responsible for the unacceptability of DE-Qs in CC. 
 
3.1.  The Standard Theory 
 
As observed above, DE-quantifiers are (in general) unacceptable in comparative 
clauses.  Consider the sentences in (12). 
 
(12)     a. *Mary is taller than no boys are. 
  b. *Mary is taller than few boys are. 
  c. *Mary is taller than fewer than eight boys are. 
  d. *Mary is taller than not every boy is. 
  e. 
?Mary is taller than at most three boys are. 
 
The systematic exclusion of DE-Qs suggests that this is a semantically motivated 
phenomenon.    Von  Stechow  (1984)  and  Rullmann  (1995)  offer  an  elegant 
semantic explanation for the restriction.  They propose that the than-clause of a 
comparative denotes the maximum of a set of degrees, see (13).  In what follows, 
I  use  Heim's  (2000)  implementation  of  this  idea,  in  assuming  that  degree 
predicates are monotone functions of type <d,<e,t>>.
1 
 
(13)  Bill is taller than Fred is 
  LF: [-er [wh1 Fred is t1,d tall]]2,d Bill is t2,d tall 
  TC: max( d.Bill is d-tall) > max( d.Fred is d-tall) 
 
This theory provides an immediate explanation of the unacceptability of DE-Qs in 
comparative clauses. 
 
                                                        
1Von Stechow 84 and Rullmann 95 use an  'exactly' interpretation of degree predicates, but the 
need to scope out every (see (15) below) is the same. 
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  LF: [-er [wh1 no student is t1,d tall]]2,d Bill is t2,d tall 
  TC: max( d.Bill is d-tall) > max( d.no student is d-tall) 
 
The set of degrees [ d.no student is d-tall] has no maximum; every degree above 
the  head  of  the  tallest  student  is  a  standard  of  height  that  no  student  meets.  
Consequently, the application of a maximality operator to this set results in a 
presupposition failure.  Hence the sentence is unusable.  This is a great advantage 
for  the  standard  approach,  but  it  leads  directly  to  its  greatest  failing.    This 
approach yields incorrect truth conditions for many other quantifiers, see (15).  To 
get the correct truth conditions in these other cases, the quantifiers must scope 
out, as in (16). 
 
(15)  a.   Bill is taller than every girl is. 
    max( d.Bill is d-tall) > max( d.every girl is d-tall)  [wrong!] 
                  the height of the shortest girl! 
  b.  Bill is taller than most girls are. 
    max( d.Bill is d-tall) > max( d.most girls are d-tall)
2  [wrong!] 
     
(16)  a.  every girlx Bill is taller than x is. 
  b.  most girlsx Bill is taller than x is. 
 
The standard theory also fails with conjunctions like Bill and Fred, and non-
monotone  quantifiers  like  exactly  2  girls.  All  need  to  be  scoped  out  for  the 
standard theory to derive the correct truth conditions.  If these quantifiers are 
allowed to scope out, however, one needs a principled reason to block no student 
from scoping out, giving the coherent (17) as LF for (14): 
 
(17)   no studentx Bill is taller than x is.   
 
These faulty predictions are what M-theory was developed to correct.  As we shall 
see, however, it is unclear how to maintain an account of the ban on DE-Qs under 
M-theory. 
  It must be noted that von Stechow 84 and Rullmann 95 argue that DE-Qs 
are not the only Qs that scope under max.  They claim that NPIs, such as any, and 
disjunction  also  scope  under  max.  [For  M-  and  E-theories,  scoping  under  the 
negation in CC is the equivalent of scoping under max.] 
 
(18)  Mary is taller than any boy is 
  max( d.Mary is d-tall) > max( d.some boy is d-tall) 
                                                        
2If there are an even number n of girls, then max( d.most girls are d-tall) is the height of the 
n/2th girl.  For example, if there are six girls, the standard theory predicts that Bill only needs to 
be taller than three for the sentence to be true.  Intuitively, though, he needs to be taller than at 
least four. 
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(19)  Mary is taller than Bill or Fred is. 
  max( d.Mary is d-tall) > max( d.Bill or Fred is d-tall) 
 
It has long been debated, without resolution, whether these are true occurrences of 
NPI  any/narrow  scope  disjunction  in  English,  or  examples  of  free-choice 
any/disjunction (see Hoeksema 1983, von Stechow 1984b,  Heim 2006a a.o.). 
There is evidence that free choice any can occur in comparatives: any in CC can 
be modified by absolutely/almost, like free choice any, unlike NPI any. 
 
(20)  Mary is taller than almost/absolutely any other girl is. 
 
Hoeksema  (1983)  presents  evidence  from  Dutch  suggesting  that  clausal 
comparatives do license NPIs.  He shows that ook maar, a Dutch NPI that does 
not have free choice readings, may occur in clausal comparatives.  If these are 
true NPIs in English, it may be that in these cases negation moves specifically to 
license the NPI (see a similar suggestion in Heim 2006a). 
  I  will  leave  the  issue  of  possible  NPI  DP  quantifiers  scoping  under 
max/negation.  In English at least, the evidence is inconclusive.  Instead I will 
endorse a version of the Heim/Kennedy generalization concerning DP quantifiers 
and degree operators.  
 
(21)  DP quantifiers scope over max/negation in the than-clause.
3 
               cp.Kennedy1999/Heim 2000 
 
3.2.  M-Theory on DE-Qs in CC 
 
M-Theory is designed to give a better account of Qs in CC.  Under M-Theory 
there is no need to scope every boy, most boys, Bill and Fred, and exactly 2 girls 
out of the than-clause (cf. Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002, Schwarzschild 2004, 
Heim 2006a).  The correct reading is derived by these quantifiers scoping over 
negation within CC. 
 
(22)  Mary is taller than every boy is. 
  M-theory: Mary's height   {d: every boy is not d-tall} 
 
Despite this success with previously problematic cases of UE-Qs, M-theory fails 
with DE-Qs.
4 As observed before, M-theory predicts coherent, contingent truth 
conditions in these cases, providing no grounds for a semantic explanation of their 
unacceptability. 
                                                        
3This is just a quick and dirty version for present purposes, see the Appendix for the official 
version. 
4Schwarzschild (2004) & Heim (2006a) use a flexible scope max in CC, the point-to-interval 
(PI) operator.  If that max scoped over a DE-Q in CC, there would be a presupposition failure.  
The question of where max scopes is the same as the scope issue for von Stechow (1984). 
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(23)  a. *Bill is taller than no girls are. 
  b. M-theory: Bill's height   {d: no girls are not d-tall} 
      "Bill is at most as tall as the shortest girl" 
 
This is not a particular failure with no girl but extends to all DE-Qs.  The reason 
is that when Q is DE, CC is downward closed. 
 
(24)  If Q is DE, CC is DC.                
 
(25)  A set of degrees D is downward closed (DC) iff  
   d,d'[ d   D and d'<d   d'   D] 
 
Now recall that the truth conditions M-theory ascribes to a comparative sentence 
require  the  measure  of  the  subject  to  be  a  member  of  CC.    So  when  CC  is 
downward closed, M-theory predicts that CC imposes a maximum on the measure 
of the subject.  In (23) the maximum is the height of the shortest girl; in (26), the 
maximum is the height of the tallest girl. 
  
(26)  *Bill is taller than not every girl is. 
  M-Theory: Bill's height   {d: not every girl is not d-tall} 
      "Bill is at most as tall as the tallest girl" 
 
It is important to observe this consequence of M-theory, since this failure with 
DE-Qs is tied to directly to its success with NM-Qs. 
 
3.3.  E-theory on DE-Qs in CC 
 
E-theory inherits M-theory's success with quantifiers but also offers an account of 
DE-Qs.    E-theory  predicts  that  a  CC  containing  a  DE-Q  yields  trivial  truth 
conditions (see von Stechow 1984: 34).  It has been suggested that systematic 
triviality can be a cause of unacceptability (Barwise & Cooper 1982, Chierchia 
1984, von Fintel 1993).  I will endorse such an analysis of the unacceptability of 
DE-Qs in CC under E-theory. 
  E-Theory inherits M-theory's advantages with UE-Qs.  In fact, E-theory 
and M-theory are equivalent when Q in CC is UE.  When the Q in CC is UE, CC 
is upward closed (UC).  If a set of degrees D is upward closed, D contains the 
maximum of another set of degrees D’ if and only if D overlaps D’. 
 
(27)  MC is DC and MC has a maximum.             
(28)  If Q is UE, CC is UC.                
(29)  A set of degrees D is upward closed (UC) iff  
   d,d'[ d   D and d'<d   d'   D] 
(30)  For sets of degrees D,D' where D is DC and has a maximum and D' is UC,  
  max(D) D' iff D D'                 
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without scoping these Qs out.  Now I show that E-theory predicts that whenever 
Q is DE the comparative sentence is trivially true. 
  This  prediction  is  pointed  to  already  in  von  Stechow's  (1984:34) 
discussion of how Seuren (1973) might handle (31).
5  Von Stechow observes that 
(31) is a tautology. 
 
(31)  a. *Sue is smarter than neither Bill nor Mary is 
  b. ( d)[Sue is d-smart & ~~(Bill or Mary is d-smart)] 
 
As observed in (27), MC is always DC and, when CC contains a DE-Q, CC is DC 
as well.  These two observations nearly, but do not quite, guarantee that when Q is 
DE a comparative sentence is always true, under E-Theory.  Recall that E-theory 
requires that the intersection of MC and CC is not empty.  When MC and CC are 
both downward closed, it means that they are both initial segments of the scale – 
when non-empty.  Two non-empty initial segments of a scale must overlap. 
  It is plausible to assume that MC is always non-empty.  The lexical entry 
for  a  gradable  adjective  properly  contains  a  presupposition  that  its  individual 
argument has a measure on the relevant scale.
6 
 
(32)  [[ tall ]]  =  d. x: x   domain(height).height(x)   d 
 
I  will  stipulate  that  CC  is  presupposed  to  be  non-empty,  as  well.
7    This  is 
necessary,  for  example,  to  rule  out  sentences  such  as  (33).    If  there  were  no 
students, CC, given in (33), would be empty and (33) false in that case.  In many 
cases,  the  presupposition  that  CC  is  non-empty  is  indistinguishable  from  the 
presupposition that the restrictor of Q is non-empty. 
 
(33)  a.  *Mary is taller than not every student is tall. 
  b.  {d: not every student is not d-tall} ( = {d: some student is d-tall} ) 
 
(34)  Assumption: CC is presupposed to be non-empty. 
 
Given (24), (32), and (34), it follows that when Q is DE and the comparative 
clause  is  defined,  it  will  always  be  true.    I  propose  that  it  is  this  systematic 
triviality explains the unacceptability of (36). 
 
(35)  The intersection of any two non-empty DC sets of degrees is non-empty.   
 
(36)  *Fred is taller than no student is 
                                                        
5Note that Seuren (1973) differs from E-theory in scope of negation; but this is irrelevant to the 
triviality account. 
6On certain closed scales, the meaure assigned to an individual might be 0. 
7This issue doesn't arise in von Stechow's example (31) since CC contains referring 
expressions. 
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For explicit proposals that certain kinds of tautologies and contradictions should 
be  considered  ill-formed  see  Chierchia  (1984),  Gajewski  (2002)  and  Fox  and 
Hackl (2006). 
 
3.4.  Summary 
 
In this section, we have reviewed the standard account of the unacceptability of 
DE-Qs  in  CC  due  to  von  Stechow  (1984).    We  observed  that  the  standard 
accounts correct predictions in this case lead to wrong predictions for many other 
quantifiers.  M-theory solves many of the problems of the standard account, but 
fails to offer a principled account of DE-Qs.  Instead it predicts that DE-Qs in CC 
impose a maximum on the measure of the subject. 
  I  have  argued  that  E-theory  fares  the  best  so  far.    It  yields  equivalent 
results  to  the  M-theory  in  the  case  of  UE-Qs  in  CC.  By  contrast,  under  the 
assumption  that  CC  is  non-empty,  E-Theory  predicts  that  when  Q  is  DE  a 
comparative sentence has trivial truth conditions.  I have proposed that triviality 
can explain the unacceptability of DE-Qs in this case.  So, E-theory provides 
plausible  analyses  of  both  UE  and  DE-Qs  in  CC,  unlike  M-theory  and  the 
standard theory.  As we see in Section 4, however, M-theory is superior to E-
theory in its predictions concerning NM-Qs in CC.  I will show, however, that E-
theory can be amended to match M-theory’s predictions. 
 
 
4.  Non-monotonic Quantifiers (NM-Qs) 
 
The case of NM-Qs provides crucial motivation for M-theory (cf. Heim 2006a, 
Schwarzschild 2008).  M-theory gets NM-Qs like exactly two NP and 10 to 15 NP 
just right; E-theory predicts truth conditions that are too weak. 
 
(37)  Mary is taller than exactly two boys are.           
  #E-theory:{d:Mary is d-tall} {d:exactly 2 boys are not d-tall}   [weak] 
    "Mary is taller than at least two boys are" 
    M-theory: Mary's height   {d: exactly two boys are not d-tall} 
 
(38)  Mary is taller than 10 to15 boys are. 
  #E-theory: {d: Mary is d-tall} {d:10 to 15 boys are not d-tall}  [weak] 
    "Mary is taller than at least ten boys are" 
  M-theory: Mary's height   {d: 10 to 15 are not d-tall} 
 
Interestingly,  in  these  cases,  we  see  the  comparative  apparently  imposing  a 
maximum on the measure of the subject.  For example, (37) says that Mary cannot 
be taller than the third shortest boy, if there is one.  E-theory is not capable of 
imposing such maximums.  This was a plus for E-theory in the DE-Q cases. 
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coordination of a UE-Q and a DE-Q: at least two boys and at most two boys.  
Thus, M-theory's success with exactly two is tied directly to its failure with DE-
Qs.  As observed above, DE-Qs in CC are unacceptable, but M-theory predicts 
that the truth conditions of a comparative sentence with a DE-Q in CC impose a 
maximum on the measure of the subject.  When an NM-Q is in CC, the truth 
conditions impose both a lower bound and a maximum on the measure of the 
subject.  The UE-Q part of exactly two is responsible for the lower bound; the DE-
Q part is responsible for the maximum.  So, M-theory succeeds with NM-Qs for 
the very reason it fails with DE-Qs.  Now we turn to E-theory’s problems with 
NM-Qs. 
 
4.1.  E-theory on NM quantifiers 
 
We have seen that E-theory can capture unacceptability of DE-Qs.  However, E-
theory  fails  with  NM-Qs,  predicting  truth  conditions  that  are  too  weak.    For 
example, E-theory currently predicts that (39) is true if and only if Mary is taller 
than at least two boys.  Note that E-theory does not impose a maximum on the 
measure  of  the  subject  when  CC  contains  something  DE;  in  the  NM  case,  a 
maximum is required.  In this section, I address the question of how E-theory can 
be fixed on this point. 
 
(39)  Mary is taller than exactly two boys are. 
  #E-theory:{d:Mary is d-tall} {d:exactly 2 boys are not d-tall}   [weak] 
 
Our goals for E-theory are (i) to rule out the weak reading that E-theory generates 
for NM-Qs and (ii) to derive the correct readings, that is, to find a way to impose 
maximums on the measure of the subject consistent with E-theory.  I propose that 
goal (i) can be accomplished through a plausible pragmatic economy condition 
and  that  goal  (ii)  follows  from  the  proper  analysis  of  the  non-monotonic 
expressions in question. 
  First notice that, in practice, UE-Qs in CC can impose maximums on the 
measure of the subject by scalar implicature. 
  
(40)  Mary is taller than some of the boys are. 
  Implicature: Mary is not taller than all the boys are.  
 
(41)  Bill is taller than two students are. 
  Implicature: Bill is not taller than three students are.        
 
When I assert that Bill is taller than two students are, I implicate that I do not have 
evidence that Bill is taller than three students are.  If we add in the assumption 
that I am informed, we can infer that I know that he is not taller than three.  No 
matter our theory of the comparative, we can derive this as a global implicature 
when CC contains a weak scalar UE-Q. 
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truth conditions of comparative sentences containing NM-Qs.  Landman (1998) 
and Krifka (1999) draw our attention to important parallels between the negative 
implications  of  NM-Qs  like  exactly  two  and  the  products  of  implicature-
generating mechanisms.  Landman observes that analyzing exactly two NP as a 
semantic  unit  will  not  derive  the  correct  truth  conditions  for  the  cumulative 
reading of (42), under which (42) is true iff exactly two students danced with 
professors and exactly two professors danced with students. 
 
(42)  Exactly two students danced with exactly two professors. 
 
(43)  Two students danced with two professors. 
 
Landman suggests that semantically exactly two means the same as two but comes 
with  the  requirement  that  it  be  strengthened  by  implicature-generating 
mechanisms.    In  other  words,  the  at  most  two  component  of  exactly  two’s 
meaning comes from the same place as two’s scalar implicatures.  Hence, for 
Landman, the truth conditions of (42) are derived from the truth conditions and 
implicatures of (43). I refer the reader to Landman (1998) for details. 
  The  implicature-generating  mechanism  I  assume  is  inspired  by  Fox's 
(2007)  covert  alternative-sensitive  EXH,  cf.  (45).
8    Incorporating  Landman’s 
insights, the Logical Form of exactly two is given in (44).  I mark the 'focus' of 
EXH with bold. 
 
(44)  a. Exactly two students smoke.   
  b. Logical Form: EXH[ 2 students smoke] 
 
(45)  EXH(pst)(A<st,t>)(w)  iff  p(w)=1 &  q A[ q(w)=1   p   q ] 
 
Generally, the EXH triggered by exactly takes local scope.  Observe, for example 
that a weaker wide-scope reading for EXH is unavailable in (46). 
 
(46)  Every boy read exactly two books 
  a. Every boyx EXH[ x read 2 books] 
  b. #EXH[every boy read 2 books]      (unavailable meaning) 
      "Every boy read two books and not every boy read three books" 
 
Under E-theory, as we have already observed, when EXH takes narrow scope – 
that is within CC, the result is truth conditions that are too weak. 
 
(47)  Local Scope EXH 
  Bill is taller than exactly two students are. 
 #  d[Bill is d-tall and EXH[ 2 students are not d-tall]]    (wrong meaning) 
                                                        
8Fox (2007) develops a more sophisticated method of picking out the alternatives to be 
negated.  Such developments are unnecessary for the simple cases considered here. 
MORE ON QUANTIFIERS IN COMPARATIVE CLAUSES 351  "Bill is taller than (at least) two students are." 
 
Notice, in particular, that under E-theory, the narrow scope LF is predicted to 
have the same truth conditions as a sentence in which there is no occurrence of 
EXH. 
  I propose to rule out this reading by means of a pragmatic principle that 
governs the use of EXH.  Specifically, I propose that when EXH is triggered, as 
by exactly, it must have an effect on truth conditions.  In (47), it has no effect: 
(48a) and (48b) are equivalent.  
 
(48)  a.  d[Bill is d-tall and EXH[ 2 students are not d-tall]] 
  b.  d[Bill is d-tall and 2 students are not d-tall] 
 
I must be pointed out that the equivalence between (48a) and (48b) holds only 
under the assumption that the CC {d: EXH[2 students are not d-tall]} is non-
empty, which I have already suggested is presupposed.  Otherwise, the LFs would 
have different truth conditions.  In particular, if there is a tie for second shortest 
student, then there would be no degrees to which exactly two students are tall, but 
there would still be a non-empty set of degrees to which (at least) two students are 
tall.  In such a situation, (48b) could be true while (48a) is false.  As long as we 
assume that CC is presupposed to be non-empty, we see that (48a) and (48b) have 
the same truth value whenever they are both defined. 
  Furthermore, I propose that when local scope yields no change in truth 
conditions, EXH is permitted to apply with wider scope.  For example, due to the 
equivalence of (48a) and (48b), EXH is allowed to take widest scope in the LF of 
(47). 
 
(49)  Wide Scope EXH 
  Bill is taller than exactly two students are. 
  EXH[ d[Bill is d-tall and 2 students are not d-tall]]  
 
This LF has distinct truth conditions from the LF with no EXH cf. (48).  This LF, 
unlike  (48),  says  that  Bill  cannot  be  taller  than  the  third  shortest  student,  as 
desired.  Hence, the maximum on the measure of the subject derives not from the 
semantics of the comparative but from the grammatically triggered ‘implicature’ 
of the quantifier contained in the than-clause.  
  To summarize, E-theory faces prima facie difficulties with non-monotonic 
quantifiers.    Specifically,  it  predicts  weak  truth  conditions,  failing  to  impose 
necessary maximums on the measure of the subject.  I have proposed that this is 
not  a  problem  for  E-theory.  The  maximums  derive  not  directly  from  the 
interpretation  of  the  comparative  but  from  the  interpretation  of  the  NM-Qs.  
Following Landman (1998) and Krifka (1999), I assume that the DE component 
of  quantifiers  like  exactly  two  derives  from  the  implicature-generating 
mechanism, EXH.  The insertion of EXH, I propose, is subject to an economy 
condition requiring it to have an effect on truth conditions.  When EXH fails to 
have an effect locally, it can apply at a higher position in the LF.  In the case of 
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section, we examine some other cases of non-monotonic quantifiers.  
  Beck (2008a&b). arrives at a similar conclusion about exactly for related 
but different reasons in an interval-based semantics for comparatives. Also see 
Landman (2005) for a different approach to this problem. 
 
4.2.  Other Non-Monotonic Quantifiers 
 
In this section, we will consider to what extent the analysis of exactly applies to 
other cases of NM-Qs.  We examine two cases: continuous and non-continuous 
non-monotonic quantifiers.  Continuity for quantifiers is defined as in (50), cf. 
Keenan (1996). 
 
(50)  Q is continuous iff for all X,Y,Z if X Q & Z Q & X Y Z, then Y Q 
 
Exactly n NP is a continuous NM-Q.  I will show below that other continuous 
NM-Qs,  such  as  between  n  and  m  NP  can  fall  under  the  same  analysis  in 
comparatives  as  exactly.    Non-continuous  quantifiers,  like  an  even  number  of 
NPs, on the other hand present something of a problem. 
  First, consider the continuous NM-Q 10 to 15.  For (51) to be true, Mary 
must be taller than 10 but not taller than 16 boys.  How could we derive such a 
meaning in the manner we used for exactly. 
 
(51)  Mary is taller than 10 to 15 boys are. 
 
I  propose  that  the  expression  10  to  15  is  an  indefinite  ranging  over  numbers 
between 10 and 15 and that at LF it sits in the degree argument slot of a covert 
version of Hackl’s (2000) many.
9 
 
(52)  [[  many ]] =  d. P. Q.|P Q|>d 
 
The objects quantified over by the indefinite 10 to 15 are ordered.  Given such a 
semantics, in positive environments, quantifying over the closed interval [10,15] 
is the same as just using 10.  So, an EXH must apply within the scope of the 
indefinite 10 to 15 in order for the quantification over numbers to make sense.  
 
(53)  n to m NPs VP 
  logical form:  d [n,m] EXH [ d-many NPs VP ] 
  
Notice that when both the indefinite over numbers and EXH scope within CC, 
there is no effect on the truth conditions under E-theory.  The set of degrees (54a) 
is always an initial segment of (54b) (when both are defined).  If the subject’s set 
of degrees overlaps one, it overlaps the other. 
 
                                                        
9(52) is a simplification of Hackl’s proposal, ignoring plurality. 
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  b. {d:  n [10,15][n-many boys are not d-tall]} 
 
This licenses wide scope for EXH.  The indefinite quantifier over numbers must 
then also scope out, perhaps by choice function.
10  This gives us (55) as the final 
logical form for (51). 
 
(55)   n [10,15][EXH[ d[Mary is d-tall and n-many boys are not d-tall]]] 
 
Essentially, this LF says that there is a number n between 10 and 15 such that 
Mary is taller than exactly n boys.  Crucially, this entails that she must be taller 
than 10 boys and can’t be taller than 16. 
  We  encounter  a  hiccup  for  E-theory  when  we  look  at  non-continuous 
quantifiers like an even number of NPs.  The reason is that we cannot force EXH 
to scope out of CC because it has no effect on truth conditions.  EXH does have 
an effect on truth conditions.  I assume the analysis in (57) for an even number. 
 
(56)  Mary is taller than an even number of boys are. 
 
(57)  an even number of NPs VP 
  logical form:  n {m: m is even}[EXH[ n-many NPs VP]]  
 
Even when both are non-empty, it will not always be the case that (58a) and (58b) 
share the same lower bound.  Hence, adding EXH within CC does have an effect 
under E-theory.  
 
(58)  a. {d:  n {m: m is even}EXH[n-many boys are not d-tall]} 
  b. {d:  n {m: m is even} [n-many boys are not d-tall]} 
 
Consider this scenario: There are 4 boys.  One shorter than 5’.  Two are exactly 
5’. One is 5’2”.  In this scenario, both sets are non-empty, but 5’1”   (58b) and 
5’1”   (58a). 
  As it stands then, E-theory predicts that (56) could be true in a scenario in 
which Mary is taller than exactly five boys, contrary to fact.  At this point, I do 
not  have  a  solution  to  this  problem.    One  possibility  might  be  to  restrict  the 
models in which we assess the contribution of EXH to those in which measure 
function  are  injective,  i.e.,  all  individuals  are  distinguished  from  each  other.  
Presently, I have no motivation for making such a restriction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
10I assume that EXH cannot take an operator's O trace as focus when O is within EXH's scope, 
as this leads to vacuous quantification in the focus alternatives. 
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M-theory treats all non-monotonic DPs alike and is successful with exactly n, 
between n and m and an even number.  E-theory on the other hand depends on the 
scope of EXH for its successful analysis of exactly n and between n and m and 
faces a challenge in an even number.  Landman (1998) and Krifka (1999) provide 
compelling  arguments  for  the  analysis  of  exactly  n  into  a  numeral  and  an 
implicature  mechanism  –  EXH  for  us.    But  not  all  non-monotonic  DPs  lend 
themselves to this kind of an analysis.  A non-monotonic DP whose structure does 
not involve EXH would help us to decide between E-theory and M-theory.  I 
think that explicit coordinations of UE- and DE- Qs are such DPs. 
  The  explicit  coordination  of  a  UE-Q  and  a  DE-Q  does  not  derive  its 
maximum from EXH, but from the DE-Q.  M-theory predicts such a coordination 
to impose a maximum on the measure of the subject.  
 
(59)  a. *Bill is taller than some girls but no boys are. 
  b.*Bill is taller than every boy but not every girl is. 
 
(60)   P<e,t>.[[ some girls]] (P) = 1 and [[ no boys]] (P)=1 
 
These sentences not only fail to impose maximums, they are simply unacceptable. 
 
(61)  *Bill is taller than some girls but no boys are.         
  E-theory:  d[Bill is d-tall & some girls but no boys are not d-tall] 
(62)  Bill is taller than some girls are. 
 
E-theory, on the other hand, predicts that the presence of the DE conjunct will 
have  no  effect  on  truth  conditions.
11  That  is,  E-theory  predicts  (61)  to  be 
equivalent to (62). As an extension of our earlier principle, I suggest this triviality 
of contribution as the source of unacceptablity. 
  Conjunctions of determiners are predicted to have the same status. 
 
(63)  ??Bill is taller than some but not all the students are. 
  ??Bill is taller than more than 2 but fewer than 7 students are. 
 
Judgments  on  these  vary;  but  for  nearly  all  my  informants  they  are  an 
improvement over (59).  I do not know why this is so. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
E-theory of the semantics of comparatives (6) provides a better account of the 
interpretation of the full range of DP quantifiers in comparative clauses than M-
theory (4).  M-theory accounts for the interpretation of UE and NM quantifiers, 
                                                        
11Again, under the presupposition that CC is non-empty. 
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supplemented with the correct approach to NM-Qs, accounts for UE, DE and NM 
quantifiers – though a problem of over-generation remains for E-theory with non-
continuous NM-Qs. 
  This paper has specifically addressed the interpretation of DP quantifiers 
in comparative clauses.  These quantifiers are marked out as a class due to the 
Heim/Kennedy Generalization, see (64) below.  Reconciling these results with an 
approach to non-DP-quantifiers is a goal for further research.  Also, the use of 
negation in the than-clause must be refined to accommodate differentials. 
 
 
Appendix: Logical Form 
 
I assume a Bresnan 1973-style syntax:  Bill is taller than every girl is 
            
     
           DegP3,d            
                  Bill    AP 
    -er       CP 
                            t3,d           tall 
           wh1,d          IP 
 
               every girl4 
              is         
                DegP2,d 
                  t4       AP 
               t1,d  not        
                 t2,d        tall 
 
 
Degree negation:  [[  not ]]  =  d. f<d,t>.f(d)=0          see Heim's (2006b) little 
M-theory:     [[  -er ]]  =  P<d,t>. Q<d,t>.max(Q) P 
E-theory:      [[  -er ]]  =  P<d,t>:P   . Q<d,t>.P Q   
 
The DegP embedded in the than-clause is capable of taking higher scope.  This is 
apparently necessary for certain modals: allow, have to, require etc.  For DPs it is 
not possible: 
 
(64)  Heim/Kennedy Generalization 
If the scope of a quantificational DP contains the trace of a DegP, it also 
contains that DegP itself.             (Heim 2000) 
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